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"[Members of the commission] simply state that smoking marijuana in the privacy of your home should be perfectly legal--as long as no one gave it to you [or] sold it to you and you didn't grow it yourself." W. Walter Menninger |
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DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington DC. 20503 July 13, 1999
The purpose of this letter is to share with you the enclosed discussion paper which proposes that the Administration develop counterdrug program enhancements above the President's budget request. These program enhancements would meet emerging drug control challenges in Colombia arid the Andean Ridge and establish the forward-based counterdrug facilities needed to replace access to Howard Air Force Base, Panama.
Emerging drug control challenges in Colombia and the Andean Ridge threaten regional supply reduction efforts and larger U.S. security interests. Our collective efforts to implement the President's counterdrug strategy have reduced the global potential production of cocaine by 29 percent over the last three years. It now appears that these international drug control gains are eroding. CIA global crop estimates for CY 1999 will show a large increase in cocaine production potential, eliminating most, if not all of the gains of the last two years. The continued explosion of coca cultivation and increases in opium poppy cultivation in Colombia undermine the U.S. source zone strategy and Colombian democratic institutions, and will continue to promote cocaine addiction the world over. Colombia's ability to respond to this emerging drug threat is compromised by interlocking economic, political, and social problems. Meanwhile, U.S. government efforts to establish Forward Operating Locations to support counterdrug operations have been hamstrung by the lack of adequate Congressional support and the lack of long-term access agreements with our regional partners.
Key members of Congress are actively pursuing an FY 2000 Emergency Counterdrug Supplemental very similar to last year's legislation. Unfortunately, preliminary drafts of the Congressional effort indicate that the targeted Congressional spending would not provide the correct mix of assets to respond to the emerging challenges identified above.
The initiative framed in the enclosed document will meet emerging requirements, build upon the success achieved in international drug control this decade, and extend the supply disruption in the cocaine industry into the coming decade. I request your support on the critical issue to ensure that adequate resources are committed to this effort. I appreciate your continued leadership and support of our international drug control efforts.
Sincerely,
Barry R. McCaffrey
Director
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF NATIONAL
DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503
ONDCP/July 13, 1999
Discussion Paper Western Hemisphere Counterdrug Program Enhancements
I. Purpose. To propose program enhancements above the President's budget request to meet newly emerging drug control threats in the Western Hemisphere.
II. Background.
A. U.S. International Drug Control Policy -- Western Hemisphere Successes.
U.S. interagency implementation of the PDD-14 directed source country strategy has achieved tactical success over the last three years and is worth continued national support. According to CIA estimates, U.S. supported drug control programs have reduced cocaine global potential production by 29 percent since 1995. Coca cultivation in Peru, once the source of over half of the world's coca leaf, has been reduced by 56 percent since 1995. Over the last two years, the Banzer Administration in Bolivia has, turned around its drug control effort and achieved a 22 percent reduction in coca cultivation. Interdiction and intelligence flights operating from Howard, AFB in Panama played a key role in these successes.
B. Emerging Challenges - Growing Drug Crisis in the Andean Ridge.
Illicit drug trafficker operations in the cocaine source zone have adapted to previously successful law enforcement and interdiction programs. The international drug control gains that we have achieved over the last three years are now eroding. Traffickers have established new routes to evade the regional interdiction effort and are expanding cultivation and production. CIA global crop estimates for CY 1999 will show a large increase in cocaine production potential, eliminating most if not all of the gains of last two years.
Continued explosion of coca cultivation and increases in opium poppy cultivation in Colombia undermine the U.S. source zone Strategy and Colombian democratic institutions. Colombia now dominates global cocaine cultivation, production, and trafficking. Colombian coca cultivation has doubled in two years from 50,000 hectares in 1995 to 100,000 hectares in 1998. CIA will report continued rapid expansion in Colombia coca potential production next January. Over the last decade, Colombia heroin poppy cultivation baa expanded from almost no growth to over 6,000 hectares, producing enough high purity heroin to meet over half of U.S. demand. Virtually all of the new cultivation is occurring in area controlled by guerrilla or paramilitary groups, contributing to the erosion of democratic institutions and ascendancy of extremism and violence.
Colombian security forces are nor capable of conducting effective counternarcotics operations in the Putumayo and Caqueta growing regions, source of two-third, of Colombian coca, due to guerilla control of the area. Intelligence assessments have identified numerous deficiencies in training, force structure, leadership, intelligence, mobility, and communications which must be corrected if the GOC is to mount credible CD operations. Unless the Government of Colombia succeeds in establishing a security presence in the coca growing regions, Colombian coca cultivation will continue to expand and the guerrilla movement will continue to strengthen.
Colombia's ability to respond to the emerging drug threat is compromised by interlocking economic, political, and social problems. The government remains wedded to a faltering peace process. The negotiations scheduled to begin July 7 were postponed by the guerrillas, who then launched a nationwide offensive on July 3, raising anew questions of their commitment to establishing a lasting peace. Meanwhile, the guerillas continue committing acts of violence against the government and the civilian population, including widespread kidnapping. Violence continues at a level that undermines democracy and the rule of law. There are now more displaced people in Colombia than in Kosovo at the height of the recent conflict. Colombia's economy is suffering through its first recession in more than 25 yeas. GDP shrink by more than five percent in the first six months of the calendar year. With unemployment rates at 20 percent, the populace is turning to the guerrilla, parami1itaries and narcotraffickers for paying jobs. Meanwhile, capital flight and brain drain accelerate.
In Peru, the drug control situation is deteriorating. The period of disruption in the Peruvian cocaine industry appears to be ending. Traffickers have adjusted routes and methods to reduce the effectiveness of law enforcement and interdiction operation Peruvian coca prices have been rising since March 1998, making alternative development and eradication more difficult. Farmers are returning to abandoned fields and the central growing areas are rejuvenating. Clearly, rebounding cultivation in Peru would be a setback to U.S. interests.
In Bolivia, continued reductions in cultivation are expected but there is cause for long-term concern. The cocaine industry is still intact and prices remain high. Coca growers have instigated many acts of violence. Progress continues to depend on the will of the Banzer Administration to incur considerable political risk to achieve long-term coca reductions and on the availability of sufficient alternative, development funds to provide coca farmers with licit income alternatives.
The withdrawal of U.S. counterdrug operations forces from Panama by December 31, 1999 will challenge our ability to maintain adequate levels of support to the hemispheric drug control effort. DoD ant DOS must establish a new structure to support forward, source zone, counterdrug operations to replace access to Panama facilities. USG efforts to establish Forward Operating Locations are complicated by (1) the lack of adequate Congressional support to secure the required Overseas Military Construction budget and authority, and (2) the lack of long-term access agreements with the Governments of The Netherlands and Ecuador.
III. Discussion.
A. Meeting the New Challenges
Meeting these emerging drug control challenges will require program enhancements above the President's budget request. Over the last several months, the interagency has assessed the rapid changes taking puce in international trafficking organization's structure and operating methods and identified required changes in U.S. operational concepts and program support. Program enhancements would accomplish the following:
Expanded cooperation with Colombia. Increasing Colombia's ability to respond to rapidly expanding drug cultivation, production, and trafficking is the most pressing international drug control challenge.
Increased support to Source Zone CD efforts. Illicit drug cultivation and production is a regional threat that requires a coordinated regional response. Otherwise, increasing the effectiveness of counterdrug programs in one country displaces drug cultivation and production within the region while only achieving short-term disruption of the industry as a whole. To build on the recent success of our international drug control effort, Peruvian and Bolivian programs require continued support and modest enhancements in selected areas. Also, successes in Peruvian and Bolivian programs have increased the drug trafficking threat to Venezuela, Brazil, and Ecuador. Modest training programs and equipment enhancements would assist these spillover countries to meet emerging threats.
Additional enhancements to U.S. interdiction programs. The United Stases must also continue to improve its own abilities to interdict illicit drugs more effectively by exploiting intelligence-driven defenses, improving the technological capabilities of interdiction forces, and improving information exchange between interdiction and law enforcement agencies. These supporting efforts can further reinforce the primary efforts in the source countries.
B. Proposed program enhancements. The following program recommendations, reflecting preliminary interagency thinking, would help meet the emerging challenges:
Establish counterdrug (CD) Operations in Southern Colombia ($360M). Lack of government presence and law enforcement capability in the illicit drug crop growing areas prevents effective counterdrug eradication, alternative development, and interdiction operations. Program adjustments in Colombia would accomplish the following: create Government of Colombia capability to operate with an acceptable degree of risk in the Putumayo, Caqueta, and poppy growing areas; improve infrastructure supporting Colombian eradication, interdiction, chemical control, and other Colombian CD operations; strengthen Joint Task Force-South and the military-police Joint Intelligence Center at Tres Esquinas.
Enhance Air Interdiction ($130M). The interdiction community assesses that the air transportation node that services Colombia cocaine labs and growing areas is vulnerable to interdiction. A successful interdiction campaign, similar to the Peruvian airbridge effort, could disrupt the Colombian cocaine industry without spawning violent confrontations with the illicit drug work force. These programs would establish Colombia's ability so interdict in Southern Colombia and improve upon existing capability is Northern Colombia.
Enhance Administration of Justice ($20M). Colombia's ability to legally attack trafficking organizations is weakened by poorly functioning courts, untrained judges and prosecutors, and corruption. Program enhancements would improve Administration of Justice, increase training, and support legal, judicial, and administrative reform.
Enhance Colombia Nationwide CD Operations ($60M). Programs would enhance existing Government of Colombia and Colombian National Police law enforcement, eradication and interdiction efforts. These programs would build on the success of programs in Colombia where the government already has an effective presence.
Enhance Regional Intelligence Program ($40M). A number of assessments have identified numerous shortcomings in hemispheric counterdrug intelligence capability. Intelligence enhancements would increase collection, improve assessment, and expedite targeting of transportation routes and infrastructure, drug production labs, and drug trafficking organization leadership.
Enhance Regional Interdiction Support ($l3OM). Programs will establish Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in the region. Successful execution of source zone programs is depending upon interagency detection and monitoring and intelligence support operating from DoD FOL infrastructure. FOLs provide the United States with minimum forward based infrastructure and logistics support required to implement the President's international drug control strategy and assured access over the long term to these forward based facilities. Programs also will adapt air, land, and riverine interdiction efforts to changes in trafficker routes and methods and provide modest increases to support increased interdiction challenges in Ecuador, Venezuela, and Brazil. Increased effectiveness of interdiction programs will depress trafficker demand for coca leaf, reduce coca prices, increasing the effectiveness of alternative development programs.
Expand alternative development programs ($60M). Expanded alternative development programs accelerate the damage done to the Andean coca industry without violent confrontations with a displaced labor force. In Colombia, expanded programs will provide a rapidly expanding coca labor force with licit income alternatives. In Bolivia, expanded alternative development is critical to continued reductions in coca cultivation and accomplishment of the Bolivian government's ambitious anti-coca goals.
Enhance USG Interdiction and Research and Development ($200M). Technology enhancements will improve the effectiveness of the United States drug interdiction effort. Programs would upgrade Customs sensor systems, which are nearing the end of their useful life. Over the next two years, parts for these systems will no longer be available and repair will be impossible. These upgrades will allow Customs to maintain its level of effort in the cocaine source countries where presently it provides 50 percent of the detection and monitoring effort. Upgrading the technology on USCG air and maritime platforms will greatly enhance the capability of the existing force structure. In addition, a number of new Coast Guard programs would provide it with the tools necessary to better confront the maritime go-fast threat, the predominant trafficking method in the transit zone at this time. Increasing technology investment on the Southwest border would improve Custom and Border Patrol detection of illegal drug trafficking without disrupting legitimate commerce.
D. The Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act - A flawed Strategic Framework.
Congress recently has been most supportive of enhanced international drug control spending; unfortunately many of its initiatives have not been well targeted to meet emerging threats. In 1998, Congress developed the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (WHDEA), which authorized $2.7 billion for use by drug control agencies in illicit drug supply reduction activities. The WHDEA included $56.5 million in new authority for source country and regional programs and over $2.1 billion in new authority for the improvement of U.S. transit zone interdiction capabilities.
Many of the programs supported by Congress in the WHDEA fail to provide the needed resources to meet the challenges outlined above. The priorities of the WHDEA generally do not support the United States National Drug Control Strategy. The authority in the Act exceeds documented interagency requirements, is not matched to the threat, and does not support agreed upon interagency operational concepts. The authority is also very narrowly constructed, in effect micromanaging Executive Branch operations, and limiting the ability of agencies to adapt programs to rapidly evolving changes in the international treat and operational concepts. Due to budget spending caps. Agencies and Departments would be forced to reduce support to higher priority programs to provide adequate outyear funding for new capital equipment. Also, Congress does not seem willing to adjust spending caps or agency base budgets to provide for outyear costs in the regular appropriations process.
Last year, Congress drafted a $942 million Emergency Supplemental to begin funding the priorities of the WHDEA, including a total of $844 million for counterdrug activities. Negotiations with the Administration improved the Supplemental sufficiently to win the President's support. This year, key members of Congress have developed a draft, $930 million Supplemental which follows the same flawed spending guidance found in the WHDEA. Crafting an Administration Supplemental would produce a better set of programs that are more responsive to emerging challenges.
IV. Conclusion
The programs outlined above meet the new challenges presented by the illicit drug trafficking industry in the Western Hemisphere. This proposed draft Administration Emergency Supplemental or budget amendment fully reflects the interagency counterdrug vision contained in the National Drug Control Stategy and PDD-14 and responds to the emerging threats in Colombia and the Andean region. Support for this initiative would build on the success achieved in international drug control strategy this decade and extend the supply disruption in the cocaine industry into the coming decade.
Sent to:
The Vice President
Secretary Albright
Secretary Cohen
Secretary Summers
Attorney General Reno
Secretary Slater
CIA Director Tenet
OMB Director
Jack Lew
NSC Adviser Sandy Berger
White House Chief of Staff John Podesta
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